Kruzits v. Okuma by unknown
1994 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-15-1994 
Kruzits v. Okuma 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994 
Recommended Citation 
"Kruzits v. Okuma" (1994). 1994 Decisions. 186. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/186 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ____________ 
 
    NO.  94-1328 
 ____________ 
 




 OKUMA MACHINE TOOL, INC.; 
 HELLER FINANCIAL, INC.; 




 VINCENT W. VISCO, d/b/a VISTEK INDUSTRIES, 
    Third-Party Defendant 
 
    Heller Financial, Inc., Appellant 
 ____________ 
 
 Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsyvlania 
 D.C. No. 93-cv-03512 
 ____________ 
 
 Argued September 19, 1994 
 Before:  GREENBERG, ROTH, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges 
                     Opinion Filed November 15, l994 
 ____________ 
 
DAVID J. GRIFFITH, ESQUIRE 
MICHELE DANIELE, ESQUIRE (Argued) 
Harvey, Pennington, Herting & Renneisen, Ltd. 
1835 Market Street, 29th Floor 
Eleven Penn Center 
Philadelphia, PA  19102 
  Attorneys for Appellant, Heller Financial, Inc. 
 
CHARLES W. CRAVEN, ESQUIRE (Argued) 
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin 
1845 Walnut Street, 18th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA  19103 
  Attorneys for Appellee, Vincent Visco 
 ____________ 
 




ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Charles Sean Kruzits, an employee of Vincent M. Visco 
d/b/a/ Vistek Industries ("Vistek"), filed a strict products 
liability action against Okuma Machine Tool, Inc., manufacturer 
of a lathe which Kruzits alleges caused him personal injuries, 
and Heller Financial, Inc. ("Heller"), in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Philadelphia County.  Heller financed the purchase of 
the lathe and holds title to it for the sole purpose of 
perfecting its security interest.  The defendants subsequently 
removed the case to the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
  In the district court, Heller filed a third-party 
complaint against Vistek seeking indemnification and defense 
under the terms of their lease agreement.  Vistek moved for 
judgment on the pleadings.  The district court granted Vistek's 
motion.  Heller appeals.1  We reverse. 
I. 
 Kruzits, an employee of Vistek, sustained injuries in 
the course of his employment while operating a lathe manufactured 
by Okuma Machine Tool, Inc.  He sued Heller and several other 
                     
1.  Heller filed its notice of appeal before the district court 
certified its order as final under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 54(b).  Thereafter, Vistek filed a motion to 
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  This court denied 
Vistek's motion because the district court has certified its 
order as final under Rule 54(b) and because there is no 
indication that hearing this appeal will prejudice Vistek's 




defendants for compensation for his injuries.  Heller, who merely 
financed the lathe but exercised no operational control over it, 
took title to it, and leased it to Vistek pursuant to the 
security lease agreement.   
  In the district court, Heller filed a third-party 
complaint against Vistek, alleging that, under the terms of its 
lease agreement, Vistek should defend and indemnify Heller in the 
underlying action.  Vistek moved for judgment on the pleadings 
contending that the language of the indemnity provision in the 
lease agreement was not specific enough to overcome the immunity 
which Vistek, as Kruzits' employer, asserted pursuant to the 
Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Act ("PWCA"), 77 P.S. § 
481(b).2 
 The district court granted Vistek's motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, holding that the PWCA precluded Heller from 
seeking indemnity from Vistek.  The court accepted Vistek's 
                     
2.   Section 481(b) of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation 
Act provides that: 
  
  In the event injury or death to an 
employee [sic] is caused by a third party, 
then such employee [sic]. . . may bring [an] 
action at law against such third party, but 
the employer . . . shall not be liable to a 
third party for damages, contribution, or 
indemnity in any action at law, or otherwise, 
unless liability for such damages, 
contributions or indemnity shall be expressly 
provided for in a written contract entered 
into by the party alleged to be liable prior 
to the date of the occurrence which gave rise 




argument that the indemnity provision in the lease agreement was 
not specific enough to overcome Vistek's employer's immunity 
under the PWCA.  The court rejected Heller's contention that 
Illinois law should govern the interpretation of the indemnity 
clause because of a choice of law provision in the lease 
agreement.3  The court concluded that Pennsylvania law should 
apply because Pennsylvania had a significant interest in the 
underlying action which justified ignoring the contractual choice 
of law provision. 
 This appeal only considers the issue of whether Heller 
can successfully bring Vistek into the underlying action as a 
third party defendant. 
II. 
 This court exercises plenary review over district court 
orders granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). See e.g., Jablonski v. Pan American 
World Airways Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1988).  Under Rule 
12(c), we will not grant judgment on the pleadings "unless the 
movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains 
to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Id. (quoting Society Hill Civic Association v. Harris, 632 
F.2d 1045, 1054 (3d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). 
A.  
                     
3.  The choice of law provision of the security lease provides, 
in pertinent part, that:  "this lease will be governed by the 
internal law and decisions . . . of the State of Illinois, 




 We must determine: first, whether Pennsylvania or 
Illinois law controls the interpretation of the indemnity clause 
of the lease agreement; and second, whether the indemnity clause 
is enforceable under the applicable law.    
 A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must 
apply the choice of law rules of the forum state. Klaxon Co. v. 
Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941); American Air 
Filter Co. v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1299 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1975).  
Accordingly, we apply Pennsylvania choice of law rules in this 
case. 
 Pennsylvania courts generally honor the intent of the 
contracting parties and enforce choice of law provisions in 
contracts executed by them.  Smith v. Commonwealth Nat. Bank, 557 
A.2d 775, 777 (Pa. Super. 1989), appeal denied, 569 A.2d 1369 
(Pa. 1990).  Pennsylvania courts have adopted section 187 of the 
Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws which provides that: 
  (1)  The law of the state chosen by the 
parties to govern their contractual rights 
and duties will be applied if the particular 
issue is one which the parties could have 
resolved by an explicit provision in their 
agreement directed to that issue. 
 
  (2)  The law of the state chosen by the 
parties to govern their contractual rights 
and duties will be applied, even if the 
particular issue is one which the parties 
could not have resolved by an explicit 
provision in their agreement directed to that 
issue, unless either 
 
  (a) the chosen state has no 
substantial relationship to the 
parties or the transaction and 
there is no other reasonable basis 




  (b) application of the law of the 
chosen state would be contrary to a 
fundamental policy of a state which 
has a materially greater interest 
than the chosen state in the 
determination of the particular 
issue . . . . 
See e.g., Schifano v. Schifano, 471 A.2d 839, 843 n. 5 (Pa. 
Super. 1984) (citing with approval the Restatement, Second, 
Conflict of Laws).  
 In this case, paragraph 21 of the lease agreement 
specifically provides that the lease will be governed and 
construed in all respects by the internal laws and decisions of 
the State of Illinois.  Accordingly, Heller contends that the 
choice of law provision in the lease agreement should be given 
effect under the conflict of law rules of Pennsylvania.  In 
particular, Heller argues that, because the issue of indemnity 
was one which the parties could have and did resolve by an 
explicit provision in their agreement, pursuant to the 
Restatement, Second, the district court should have applied the 
law chosen by the parties in construing the indemnity clause. 
 Vistek, on the other hand, argues that the district 
court correctly applied Pennsylvania law because of 
Pennsylvania's strong public policy interest in enforcing its 
 
 
Workmen's Compensation Act.4  Vistek contends that Pennsylvania 
law should govern because the underlying action involved a 
Pennsylvania worker, the accident occurred in Pennsylvania and 
the indemnity claim was against a Pennsylvania employer. 
 Vistek is correct about the character of the underlying 
action and also that Pennsylvania has a strong interest in 
protecting the terms of the PWCA, but Vistek misconstrues the 
issue that this court must resolve.  This case does not implicate 
the PWCA.  The immunity of the employer (Vistek) under the PWCA 
does not affect the obligation of the lessee (also Vistek) to 
defend and indemnify the lessor (Heller) from any liability under 
the terms of its financial arrangement with Heller. 
 The agreement between Heller and Vistek is a freely 
negotiated financing contract between two commercial entities.  
Pennsylvania courts will only ignore a contractual choice of law 
provision if that provision conflicts with strong public policy 
interests. See e.g., Soxman v. Goodge, 539 A.2d 826 (Pa.Super, 
1988); Leidy v. Desert Enterprises, Inc., 381 A.2d 164 (Pa.Super, 
1977). 
                     
4.  Vistek also asserts on appeal that the lease agreement is 
unenforceable because no one from Heller signed it.  In response, 
Heller argues that Vistek waived this issue by not raising it in 
the district court.  Furthermore, Heller contends that a signed 
copy of the lease agreement does exist and has moved to 
substitute a signed copy of the lease agreement for the unsigned 
copy they initially provided. 
 
This court will not consider an issue raised for the first time 
on appeal absent a showing that a gross miscarriage of justice 
will otherwise result. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United 
States, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1976).  Therefore, we reject 
Vistek's argument and deny Heller's motion as moot. 
 
 
   In this case, no strong public policy issues are 
infringed.  This litigation has no effect on the employer's 
rights and obligations under the PWCA and Kruzitz makes no claim 
that the third party, Heller, caused his personal injury.  On the 
other hand, Illinois, the chosen state, has "a substantial 
relationship to the parties."  In the commercial world, where an 
Illinois company, such as Heller, finances purchases of 
commodities, machinery, and equipment in many, if not all, of the 
states in the nation, it is understandable and reasonable that 
Heller include choice of law provisions in its financial 
agreements to ensure that those agreements are governed by the 
law of its principal place of business rather than the laws of 
each and every state where its borrowers do business.  We hold 
that under Pennsylvania choice of law rules, contractual choice 
of law provisions contained in a financial agreement that enables 
an employer to purchase plant equipment is binding on the 
parties. 
B. 
 Because the contractual choice of law provision is not 
superseded, Illinois law governs our interpretation of the 
indemnity clause.  Vistek contends that the Illinois' courts 
would reject the choice of law provision and apply Pennsylvania 
law to the instant case because of Pennsylvania's strong interest 
in enforcing the PWCA. See e.g., Lyons v. Turner Constr. Co., 551 
N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (Ill.App. Ct. 1990) (court disregarded 
contractual choice of law provision because applying the chosen 
law was contrary to a fundamental state policy).  As discussed 
 
 
above, this choice of law provision does not infringe on the PWCA 
or any other important Pennsylvania interest.  Therefore, this 
court looks to Illinois law to determine the effect of the 
indemnity clause. 
 In general, Illinois courts will strictly construe 
indemnity clauses. Sorrentino v. Waco Scaffolding & Shoring Co., 
358 N.E.2d 1244 (Ill.App. Ct. 1976).  However, "[i]n interpreting 
a contract for indemnity, [Illinois] courts must give the 
agreement a fair and reasonable interpretation based upon a 
consideration of the agreement as a whole."  Allen v. 
International Harvester Co., 571 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ill.App. Ct. 
1991) (citations omitted); Smith v. Clark Equipment Co., 483 
N.E.2d 1006, 1010 (Ill.App. Ct. 1985).  The courts  attempt to 
determine and then implement the intention of the parties.  
Higgins v. Kleronomos, 459 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (Ill.App. Ct. 1984). 
 The courts look to see if the indemnity clause 
specifically and clearly provides for indemnification against the 
particular underlying claims.  Sorrentino, 358 N.E.2d 1244; 
Westinghouse Elec. Elevator Co. v. La Salle Monroe Building 
Corp., 70 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ill. 1946), superseded by statutes on 
other grounds, (court will not construe a contract to indemnify 
for personal injuries to indemnify against the indemnitee's 
negligence absent express contractual language).  The Illinois 
court will enforce an indemnity clause if it is sufficiently 
clear and specific.  Owens v. Midwest Tank and Mfg. Co., 549 
N.E.2d 774, 776 (Ill.App. Ct. 1989). 
 
 
 Here the indemnity clause of the security agreement 
plainly states: 
  13. Indemnity:  [Vistek] does hereby 
assume liability for and does agree to 
indemnify, protect, save, and keep harmless 
[Heller] from and against any and all 
liabilities, losses . . . including attorneys 
fees, court costs and legal expenses of 
whatever kind or nature, imposed on, incurred 
by, or asserted against [Heller] in any way 
relating to or arising out of this Lease or 
the manufacture, purchase, ownership, 
delivery, lease, possession, use, operation, 
condition, return or other disposition of the 
equipment by [Heller] or [Vistek], . . . any 
claim arising out of strict liability in 
tort, and any taxes for which [Vistek] is 
responsible hereunder. . . . (Emphasis 
added).  
 Under Illinois law, this language is sufficient to 
require Vistek to defend and indemnify Heller.  See e.g., Patton 
v. T.O.F.C., Inc., 398 N.E.2d 313 (Ill.App. Ct. 1979) (where the 
Appellate Court of Illinois enforced an indemnity clause which 
contained language referring indirectly to strict products 
liability claims).   
 The indemnity clause at issue in this case provides 
that Vistek will assume liability for any claims arising out of 
the use, operation or condition of the lathe and "any claims 
arising out of strict liability in tort."  This clause contains a 
direct reference to strict products liability claims and Vistek 
must therefore indemnify Heller in the underlying action. 
III. 
 Therefore, we hold that under Pennsylvania choice of 
law rules, a choice of law clause in an equipment financing 
 
 
agreement between an employer and a third party is not preempted 
by the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, notwithstanding 
the PWCA provisions granting immunity to an employer from 
indemnity suits by third parties for claims against those third 
parties arising out of an employee's injuries during the course 
of employment.  We further hold that the indemnity clause is 
enforceable under Illinois law and that Vistek must indemnify 
Heller. 
 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
reversed and the case remanded with directions to reinstate 
Heller's third-party complaint and for such further proceedings 
as are consistent with this opinion.5 





                     
5.  On remand, the district may want to consider Nath v. National 
Equipment Leasing Corp., 439 A.2d 633 (Pa. 1981) which held that 
a finance lessor who is not in the business of selling or 
marketing merchandise will not be liable in a strict products 
liability action. 
